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Over the last three decades, an increasing number of countries have experienced the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and the new governments have been increasingly expected to address past human rights violations. To guarantee the nonrepetition of human rights violations, governments have adopted a wide range of measures such as criminal prosecution, truth commissions, judicial reform, reparations, memorialization, exhumations and reburials, and the lustration of police and security forces (Roht-Arriaza, 2002: 97) . 1 The number of states initiating criminal prosecutions against former state officials has been steadily increasing and scholars refer to this new trend as 'the justice cascade' (Lutz & Sikkink, 2001) or 'a revolution in accountability' (Sriram, 2003) . A close examination of the diffusion of human rights prosecutions throughout the world has important theoretical and policy implications since the importance of criminal prosecutions remain 'unrivaled' compared to other measures (Freeman, 2006: 10) .
In the mid-1980s, scholars of democratization argued that the human rights trials of former military leaders in Latin America would cause political instability and thus be less likely in the future. Huntington (1991: 228) , for example, observed that no effective criminal prosecution and punishment occurred in most transitional countries in the 1970s and 1980s
and concluded: 'In new democratic regimes, justice comes quickly or it does not come at all.'
Similarly, O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 29) predicted that such prosecutions would become less likely as 'the bitterness of memories attenuated with the passage of time' in transitional societies. However, contrary to their expectations, human rights prosecutions have dramatically increased since the mid 1990s. Lutz & Reiger (2008: 12) document the prosecutions of 34 heads of state for human rights violations between 1990 and 2008. This number dramatically increases when the cases of lower-ranking officials are also considered.
1 I refer to transitional justice as "the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes (Teitel, 2003: 69)" For more details, see Hayner (2002) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) for truth commission; Elster (2006) and For example, more than a dozen prosecutions against former presidents, military and police officers, and torture experts occurred in South Korea alone after democratization (Kim, forthcoming) .
Several factors provide the preconditions necessary for this change: the end of the Cold War and the subsequent accelerated wave of democratization, the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and the accretion of human rights treaties and the development of corresponding organizations. This new trend has been met with both enthusiasm and skepticism. Many scholars maintain that such prosecutions deter future violations (Mendez, 1997; Orentlicher, 1995; Roht-Arriaza, 2005; Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006) while others believe that prosecution will not deter future violations and that in some circumstance they will lead to an increase in repression by disrupting a nascent stability (Elster, 2006; Goldsmith & Krasner, 2003; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003 ).
Yet, while the academic literature on the impact of human rights prosecution is relatively well developed, the literature on the causes of such prosecution is still sparse. Why do states pursue criminal prosecutions against former state officials on the charge of human rights violations? What explains the global diffusion of such prosecutions? There have been a few attempts to integrate dispersed theories from various disciplines and subdisciplines of political science, sociology, criminology, and law (Backer, 2009; Grodsky, 2010; Huyse, 1995; Pion-Berlin, 1994; Skaar, 1999 ), but we still know little about them. Moreover, despite the emergence of recent examples of cross-national analysis (Dancy & Poe, 2006; Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010; Roper & Barria, 2009) , the field has been dominated by case studies of a single or a small number of countries. Although the details of the prosecution process can be traced closely in these case studies, the variations in the way decisions are made to adopt De Greiff (2006) for reparations; and Freeman (2010) and Mallinder (2008) prosecutions. My study further shows that domestic advocacy plays a crucial role in criminal prosecutions of high-profile state officials while international pressure is more effective in promoting prosecutions of low-profile officials. Second, the diffusion theory is also supported since the occurrence of human rights prosecutions in neighboring countries is a relevant factor.
Interestingly, transitional countries are most sensitive to trials occurring in culturally or linguistically similar countries and this supports the constructivist's norm diffusion theory, which focuses on the role of identity and communication in the diffusion process. However, I
find that the power balance explanation, which has been the prevailing explanation, is valid only for the immediate use of human rights prosecutions. I find that the level of repression in the former authoritarian regime, the past history of political instability, and prevailing current economic conditions are also relevant.
In the first section, I review and discuss the various arguments in comparative politics, international relations, human rights, and the international law literature that suggest some of the structural determinants of human rights prosecutions. In the second section, I present the research design including dependent and independent variables, controls and methods, and a discussion on the sample that defines countries undergoing democratic transition. In the third section, the statistical evidence is examined using various models of event history analysis. I conclude with a summary and suggestions for future research.
Why do states use human rights prosecutions?

Balance of power between old and new elites
Why do states hold former state officials criminally accountable for past human rights violations following democratization? Huntington (1991: 215) asserts that such prosecutions are short-lived phenomena and are only possible within a short period immediately after transition. The most important determinant then is the balance of power that exists between the old and new elites immediately after transition. Huntington further argues that the power structures of transitional countries are determined by the type of transition (transformation, transplacement, and replacement), which significantly affects cohesion among security forces.
Therefore, military defeat or other dramatic breaks within the old order that lead to a replacement of the old regime, work positively towards holding those responsible accountable.
In other transformations where old elites decide to adopt democracy or transplacements where old and new elites negotiate the terms of the transition, accountability is less likely.
The power balance theory has been widely supported since the 1990s (Huyse, 1995; Nino, 1996; Pion-Berlin, 1994; Skaar, 1999; Zalaquett, 1992 However, scholars started to question the power balance theory when they noticed that more and more states were willingly using criminal prosecutions; and they saw that the demand for justice and accountability grew in intensity over time. First, the power balance theory loses its validity when it comes to cases of delayed justice, where the power balance becomes a constant, unvarying factor long after transition. Second, the power balance theory, which exclusively focuses on domestic politics, tends to neglect altogether the role of international politics or broader external social relations. Third, since the power balance theory relies on the decision-making model of a few elites, it fails to grasp the dynamics and changes in the demand for justice from victims and activists over time.
Transnational advocacy networks
Since the 1990s, scholars have observed that the demand for justice and accountability from victims has become increasingly effective. This change was a puzzle because the demand from the affected population had always been present but had not always presented a politically effective advocacy for judicial accountability. In other words, the demand from victims had been a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition to explain the new tide rights-prosecution-database).
of accountability. Scholars, therefore, started to pay attention to the increase in the number and effectiveness of domestic and international advocacy groups. 3 Some scholars find the role of individuals and civil society movements to be more important (Backer, 2003; RohtArriaza, 2002) , while others stress the role of international organizations (Bassiouni, 2002; Buergenthal, 1994) in promoting trials.
Scholars of international relations had already discovered the important role of individuals and advocacy groups in bringing normative changes to politics (Finnemore, 1996) .
The transnational advocacy networks theory provides a useful analytic framework for incorporating existing explanations both at the domestic and international level (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Kaufmann & Pape, 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998) . Advocacy networks are committed and knowledgeable actors who work on specialized issues and promote causes and principled ideas and norms, which include international and domestic NGOs, the media, and parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 8-9 
Diffusion theory
Diffusion refers to the process where 'prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining nonadopters' (Strang, 1991: 325) . Diffusion occurs when the decision to proceed with a human rights prosecution in one country is influenced by previous choices of other countries with an authoritarian past. In earlier studies of human rights prosecutions, the contagion effect was often introduced but found insignificant due to a lack of evidence (Pion-Berlin, 1994: 126) . However, after witnessing the dramatic increase in human rights prosecutions around the globe, increasingly more scholars are suggesting that there is a diffusion of individual accountability (Roht-Arriaza, 2002: 97; Sikkink & Walling, 2007) .
[ Figure 1 ]
The diffusion theory is plausible in cases of human rights prosecutions because the data show a spatial and temporal clustering pattern. Figure 1 illustrates this pattern both in terms of democratization and human rights prosecutions. In Latin America, 13 out of 15 transitional countries have had human rights trials (87%) while only four out of 14 countries had such trials in Asia (28%). Scholars of international relations have offered diffusion explanations on similar patterns in global politics, such as the spread of democracy (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Starr, 1991) , economic policies (Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett, 2006; Simmons & Elkins, 2004) , wars (Most & Starr, 1980) , and treaty ratifications (Simmons, 2008) .
Scholars agree that spatio-temporal clustering occurs because geographic proximity is the key determinant of the diffusion process.
Constructivists in international relations studying the spread of norms lead us to similar expectations. Norms are 'standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein, 1996: 5) ' and human rights prosecution is a new judicial model containing the norm of individual criminal accountability, stating that the perpetrators of human rights should be held accountable. Scholars of norm diffusion discovered that after a tipping point, norms have an independent effect through 'a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895) .' In this process, communication and shared understanding of the norm among like-minded states are more important than simple geographic proximity. In sum, both policy and norm diffusion theories lead us to the tool to promote and protect human rights (S/2004/616 
Research design
To test these hypotheses, I used our new dataset on human rights prosecutions in 71 countries that became democracies (democratization) between 1980 and 2006 (Appendix 1).
Democratization refers to a situation where a state changes from a repressive and closed regime such as a military, one-party, authoritarian, dictatorial, or communist regime to an open and decentralized government. Usually, the evident indicator of democratic transition is a free, fair, secret, and direct national election for major government offices, including head of state (Huntington, 1991: 7) . Neither all the countries in the world nor only the 33 countries with human rights prosecutions would be a proper sample. The former would lead one to include many irrelevant cases without democratization and a repressive past and the latter would exclude many important cases that did not have trials although they had a high probability of doing so. Following established practice (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002; Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010) , I determined transitional countries using the dataset from the Polity IV Project.
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Dependent variables
Human rights prosecution is executive and/or judicial activities before, during, and resulting from criminal procedures brought against former state officials on charges of human rights violations. By prosecuting human rights violations, I refer to processes including indictments, arrests, extraditions, detentions, and trials for violations of core human rights by state officials. 5 Some of the prosecutions involve former heads of state and high-level officials, but there are also trials of lower level officials including police officers and prison guards. In these cases, the core set of human right violations (torture, summary execution, disappearances and political imprisonment), genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are usually addressed. 6 Human rights cases can also be prosecuted in foreign and international courts, as in the cases of Pinochet in the UK and Milosevic at the Hague.
Although much attention is given to a number of high-profile international tribunals and foreign universal jurisdiction cases, most prosecutions take place in domestic judicial systems.
While information is readily available on the relatively small number of international trials, the data on domestic prosecutions are decentralized and difficult to quantify. To address this problem, we have created a new database consisting of data collected from the US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. When the reports mentioned a judicial proceeding that met the above criteria, a country is coded '1' for having a human rights prosecution in a given year and '0' if not. A binary variable was created to track whether a country had a prosecution at any point after transition. However, this measure has the potential danger of masking the complex, varying realities in the ranks of the accused.
Consequently, I created additional variables that measure the human rights prosecutions of high-and low-profile state officials, defined by the rank of the accused (Appendix 1).
Prosecutions are high-level if the accused falls under any of the following categories: generals, admirals, ministers, presidents, and heads/directors of security and intelligence sectors.
Sometimes, countries decide to have either only high-level or low-level prosecutions. At other creation ('99') or transformation ('97').
times, prosecutions of both high-and low-profile perpetrators proceed at the same time.
[ 
Independent variables
Power balance
Scholars of democratization and transitional justice agree that the type of transition is the most powerful predictor of the power balance between old and new elites after transition (Huntington, 1991; Huyse, 1995; Pion-Berlin, 1994; Skaar, 1999) . In addition, scholars supporting the power balance explanation suggest that human rights prosecutions can only be possible within a brief window of time after democratization.
Although their prediction is proven wrong due to the emergence of delayed justice in many transitional countries, it is probable that the power balance factor has a time-varying effect. In other words, it may not be true that countries are using human rights prosecutions only shortly after transition but it may be true that the power balance factor only affects the immediate or relatively early use of such prosecutions. The ruptured transition variable was interacted with the duration of 'post transitional regime' in order to measure the time-varying effect.
Transnational advocacy networks
Two variables were used to measure the effect of transnational advocacy networks on human rights prosecutions. First, the number of domestic human rights NGOs (Hathaway, 2007 ) was used to measure the power and effectiveness of domestic advocacy for individual criminal accountability. Although it is not entirely identical, many scholars have used the number of
NGOs as an indicator of their activities and effectiveness (Mosley & Uno, 2007; Ramos, Ron & Thoms, 2007) . Second, the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation in the country was used to measure international pressure for accountability. The leading role of the UN in promoting human rights prosecutions has long been observed (Bassiouni, 2002; Guest, 1995) and many international NGOs are working directly and indirectly in partnership with the UN It is commonly agreed that the key measure of the human rights commitment of the UN is its deployment of a peacekeeping operation (Dancy & Poe, 2006; Roper & Barria, 2009 ).
Diffusion
Policy diffusion and norm diffusion literature, respectively, point us to two different pathways through which human rights prosecutions spread: geographic proximity and cultural similarity.
If the diffusion variable measured by geographic proximity is significant, it will support the conclusions of policy diffusion literature and if the variable measured by cultural similarity is significant, it will support norm diffusion theory. 
Controls
Guided by previous studies in human rights and transitional justice literature, a set of variables is included to control for all other factors that might affect the likelihood of human rights prosecutions. First, I controlled for factors facilitating human rights prosecutions.
Scholars have argued that democracy (Herz, 1982) , democratic consolidation (Moravcsik, 2000) , private-prosecutor provision (Sikkink & Walling, 2007) , 9 economic development (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010) , and compliance to international human rights norms (Ball, 2000) 10 positively affect the state's decision to hold human rights prosecutions. Second, I
controlled for factors negatively affecting the likelihood of human rights prosecutions.
Previous studies found that the past levels and durations of repression (Roper & Barria, 2009), 7 The UN subregional division of the world includes: Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, and Middle Africa; the Caribbean, and Central, South, and Northern America; Central, East, Southern, Southeastern, and Western Asia; Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe; and Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. 8 I also used the percentage of countries having used human rights prosecutions within a state's geographic and cultural neighborhood and found no difference in the results. 9 In their study of Latin America, Sikkink & Walling (2007) suggest that private prosecutor provisions might be one explanation for the prevalence of human rights trials in Latin America since private-prosecutor provisions permit human rights groups, often acting on behalf of victims, to file criminal cases in the courts. 10 The commitment to an international human rights standard was measured by a state's ratification record the current level of repression (Nino, 1996; Pion-Berlin, 1994) , the existence of 'spoilers (Acuña & Smulovitz, 1997)', 11 and the past levels of political instability (Kim, 2008) obstruct human rights prosecutions. Finally, I also controlled for legal traditions (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999) and alternative transitional justice measures (Rotberg & Thompson, 2000) (Appendix 2).
12 Models I use a Cox proportional hazards model, which predicts the hazard rates ) (t h i , the rate at which a state i uses a trial at time t given that the state did not have a trial until time t. By estimating the hazard rates, not only whether or not a state had trials but also when, is considered since the rate is conditional on the duration. Unlike other parametric or logit models, the Cox model provides the estimates of the coefficients without making any assumption about the baseline hazard function. In addition, the Cox model shares many asymptotic properties associated with other maximum likelihood estimates and provides useful diagnostics. The functional form for the model is: For each model, the correlations among the independent variables were checked for multicollinearity and three diagnostics were used: (1) a test for proportional hazards assumption using the rescaled Schoenfeld residuals, (2) a test for an appropriate functional relating to three major international human rights conventions: ICCPR, CAT, and the Genocide Convention. 11 The so-called 'spoilers' (Acuña & Smulovitz, 1997; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003) are an active and organized group of former state officials, military and police officers, politicians, activists, and lawyers who intentionally obstruct the transitional justice process. I measured the activities of spoilers by the number of coups and coup attempts after transition using the Armed Conflict and Intervention (ACI) Datasets. 12 Truth commissions are known as the most important alternative to criminal prosecutions (Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2002) . However, it is debated whether trials and truth commissions are competitive or complimentary in nature. Some argue that truth commissions 'sacrifice the pursuit of justice (Gutmann & Thompson, 2000: 23) ' while others argue that a state willing to prosecute individuals or establish a truth commission has the political form of the covariates using the Martingale residuals, and (3) 
Power balance
The result from Model 1 shows that, contrary to the conclusions drawn from many earlier will to pursue alternative measures in the future (Sikkink & Walling, 2007) . 13 The results of all these diagnostics and tests can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. 14 Gap time is the time interval between successive repeated events, and the use of gap time is based on the assumption that a trial is not at risk for the k th event until the k-1 th trial has occurred. Instead of using the time interval between successive repeated events, an elapsed time model uses time since transition, based on the assumption that all repeated events are developing simultaneously. Both assumptions are plausible and I estimated both models. I find no differences in the results and only present the elapsed-time model. studies, the power balance between old and new elites does not affect a state's decision to use human rights prosecutions in general. The results from Models 3 and 4 also confirm this finding and suggest that the power balance explanation is not a valid framework for explaining either high-or low-level prosecutions. Then, why has the power balance theory been so widely supported by many earlier scholars? The answer can be found in the result from Model 2, which examines the possible time-varying effect of the power balance factor.
Here, both the coefficients of the power balance variable and its time interaction effect are highly significant. 15 The positive coefficient of the power balance variable suggests that human rights prosecution is more likely if the country experienced a ruptured transition, which dissolved the old elites' power and strengthened that of the new. More specifically, my model predicts that the chance of using prosecution is 2.4 times greater if the country had a ruptured transition, holding all other factors constant. But the negative coefficient of the time interaction effect suggests that the impact of the power balance factor dramatically diminishes as time passes after transition. According to the model, the power balance factor is statistically significant up to the fourth year of transition but loses its significance after that.
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[ Figure 3 ] This finding suggests that there is a partial truth in the power balance explanation.
Huntington and others correctly observed that the power balance between old and new elites is an important determinant of human rights prosecutions occurring shortly after democratization. However, these scholars were also wrong because the power balance factor can only explain a small part of the whole story. Figure 3 reveals prosecutions (23%) occurred within the first four years of democratization and this is a percentage that can be adequately explained by the power balance theory, along with other factors. Nevertheless, the power balance theory cannot explain the remaining 77% of total prosecution cases occurring beyond the fifth year of transition. In sum, my analysis shows that the power balance theory is still a valid theoretical framework for explaining the immediate and relatively early use of human rights prosecutions. However, this explanation has to be complemented with two other more powerful theories, which explain not only the early but also the late use of human rights prosecutions: transnational advocacy networks and diffusion explanations.
Transnational advocacy networks
The statistical result strongly supports the role of transnational advocacy networks in promoting individual criminal accountability in transitional countries. Across all the models, variables measuring the impact of transnational advocacy networks turn out to be highly significant. 17 In general, a state with strong domestic and international organizations advocating human rights and individual criminal accountability is likely to use human rights prosecutions more frequently and persistently. To be specific, the chance of using human rights prosecutions is 4.3 times greater if a country were to move from the minimum to the maximum level of domestic advocacy. In addition, international pressure also increases the chance of such prosecutions by a factor of 2.4. If combined, the chances of prosecution are 10 times greater in a country with the highest level of domestic and international advocacy compared to those with the lowest level. This empirical finding is important since it shows that in addition to the decision-making processes of the elite, internal and external political pressure from civil society is an indispensable determinant of human rights prosecutions. In a 17 Tests for the joint effect of the domestic and international advocacy variables are significant in Model 1 (χ 2 =8.67, df=2, p=0.013), Model 2 (χ 2 =7.47, df=2, p=0.024), and Model 4 (χ 2 =7.75, df=2, p=0.021). In addition, all statistically significant variables retain their direction and significance in separate bivariate Cox models. sense, the role of domestic and international civil society is more important than the elite decision making process because the latter has a short-term effect while the former has a lasting impact. My findings, therefore, strongly support field observations regarding the critical role of civil society advocacy groups in the transitional justice process (Hayner, 2004: 47; Kritz, 2004: 23) .
Interestingly, the results from Models 3 and 4 diverge in regard to domestic and international advocacy on the use of high-and low-level human rights prosecutions. In cases of high-level prosecutions, domestic advocacy is an important determinant of such processes while international advocacy is not. Conversely, in cases of low-level prosecutions, international advocacy is a crucial factor while domestic advocacy is not. This is a rather unexpected finding of my analysis and supports two observations from previous research.
First, prosecution of high-profile officials has an important implication for domestic politics and any external pressure or involvement would cause complications, side-effects, or backlashes and thus be less effective (Grodsky, 2010; Subotic, 2009) . Therefore, effective and persistent domestic advocacy, not international pressure, is the key determinant of high-level prosecutions in domestic courts. Second, as in the case of Germany after World War II or Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, international advocacy for individual criminal accountability is specifically designed in such a way so as to promote high-level prosecutions in international courts and low-level prosecutions in domestic courts (Bass, 2000; Sarkin, 1999) .
Diffusion
Diffusion theory is also valid in explaining the use of human rights prosecutions in transitional countries. In general, a state is more likely to initiate and repeatedly use human rights prosecutions if similar prosecutions had already been used by its neighbors. Of the two different pathways offered by the diffusion process, cultural similarity, rather than simple process. My findings indicate that the diffusion of human rights norms cannot be properly explained simply by geographic proximity, which seems to explain well the diffusion process of other ideas such as economic liberalization (Simmons & Elkins, 2004) . Thus, it is probable that at least two diffusion mechanisms exist and function differently depending on the content or 'intrinsic characteristics' of the norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 906) .
Second, this finding bolsters the argument that human rights prosecutions have a deterrent effect across borders. Kim & Sikkink (2010) finds a direct deterrent effect if a country's neighbors are pursuing human rights prosecutions, suggesting that a state, even without prosecutions of its own, may experience a similar deterrent effect of human rights prosecutions if that country has enough neighbors using such prosecutions. The diffusion of prosecutions provides another, rather indirect, mechanism of cross-border deterrence. The increase in human rights prosecutions of a country's neighbors first increases the chances of human rights prosecutions in that country through the contagion effect, and then deters future human rights violations in that country through the direct deterrence effect.
Other determinants
In addition, I find that repression in a previous authoritarian regime, past levels of political instability, and economic conditions affect a state's decision to use human rights prosecutions.
Two factors are related to the previous political history of the country and one factor is related to the current level of economic development. First, countries with an unstable past political history, measured by the number of coups and coup attempts, are more likely to use human rights prosecutions after democratization. This finding is interesting because it supports Moravcsik's (2000) argument that newly established democracies tend to lock themselves into binding human rights treaties in order to protect their fledging democracy from domestic challengers. My findings further specify the condition under which these new democracies are more likely to commit to a stronger application of domestic and international human rights p=0.845).
norms. If a country had frequent coups and regime reversions in the past, new elites are more likely to use human rights prosecutions to overcome their instability and to gain legitimacy and popular support. This argument is plausible because scholars believe that human rights prosecutions achieve these goals in newly democratized regimes (Hayner, 2002: 24; Minow, 1998: 88 Olsen; Payne, & Reiter (2010) shows that the health of the economy affect a country's transitional justice choices and more affluent countries prefer human rights prosecutions to truth commissions or amnesty laws.
Conclusion
My findings provide the first comprehensive test for three key theories explaining the emergence and diffusion of human rights prosecutions after democratization. In sum, I found very strong evidence to support the transnational advocacy networks and diffusion 
